A third documented position, taken by authorities in both camps at different points and by some as a considered middle course rather than a simple compromise, holds the question in doubt and applies Jewish law's general principle of stringency in cases of uncertainty regarding a matter of biblical severity, treating a patient as not yet halakhically dead while brain-stem function alone has ceased, out of caution against the serious prohibition against hastening death, even where this stringent approach may in practice foreclose organ donation that a less cautious ruling would permit.
The dispute has direct practical consequences that distinguish it sharply from a merely theoretical disagreement: it determines whether removing a mechanically ventilated, brain dead patient's organs for donation is understood in Jewish law as a permitted act of retrieving organs from someone already dead, or as a forbidden act of hastening or causing the death of someone still, under this framework, halakhically alive. Because the same underlying medical fact pattern receives genuinely different legal treatment depending on which position a decisor follows, the dispute has produced real and ongoing differences in organ donation rates and practice among different Orthodox Jewish communities, a live halakhic disagreement with consequences beyond the academic.