Compatibilism rarely announces itself as a religious doctrine, but it does a great deal of quiet work wherever a tradition holds both that God foreordains all things and that human beings remain genuinely responsible for their choices, a combination Reformed Christian theology in particular has defended in terms strikingly close to Hume's: God's decree determines the outcome, but the human agent still acts from their own will, reasons, and character, which is exactly compatibilist freedom applied to theological determinism.
The position's critics attack from both directions at once, which is itself evidence of how carefully it tries to split the difference: hard determinists argue compatibilist freedom is not real freedom at all, only a comfortable label attached to fully determined behavior so that moral practices like praise and blame can be preserved without examination, while libertarians argue the same thing from the opposite direction, insisting that genuine responsibility requires the agent to have been able to do otherwise in the strong, causally open sense compatibilism explicitly declines to require. Compatibilists answer both by pointing to ordinary moral practice, which already excuses the coerced and the insane while holding the calm, deliberate, uncoerced agent responsible, exactly the distinction compatibilist freedom is built to track.