The main entry's passing mention of Molinism as "an ingenious attempt at reconciliation" between divine sovereignty and human freedom compresses a technically sophisticated proposal still actively defended and disputed in contemporary philosophy of religion.
Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit, proposed that God possesses, beyond knowledge of necessary truths and of what God has decided to create, a third category, scientia media, middle knowledge: God's knowledge, prior to any decision to create, of what every possible free creature would freely choose in every possible circumstance. On this account God does not cause a person's free choices, and they remain genuinely libertarian-free, but God nonetheless knows with certainty what any person would freely do in any given situation, and can therefore choose which possible world to actualize based on that knowledge, achieving providential control without ever determining any individual free choice.
Molinism was developed to counter the rival Dominican position of Domingo Banez, which grounded God's providential control in a more direct divine "physical premotion" of the will, a position Molina's Jesuit successors argued came dangerously close to determinism, and the resulting De Auxiliis controversy, mentioned elsewhere in this collection, was fought before Vatican tribunals for years without a decisive ruling, leaving both positions permitted in Catholic theology today. The theory has drawn renewed attention through Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig, and its central difficulty, the "grounding objection," asks what makes counterfactual claims about a free creature's hypothetical choices true or knowable at all, even to God, if the choice remains genuinely undetermined.