Emptiness is common ground across Mahayana and the starting point of its internal arguments rather than the end of them.
Madhyamaka, Nagarjuna's school, holds that the correct position is the absence of any position: it advances no thesis about what ultimately exists and works by dismantling the theses of others. Later Tibetan scholastics divided this further, between those who thought the analysis could be set out in formal argument and those who held it must proceed only by drawing out the consequences of an opponent's own premises.
Yogacara developed a different account, analysing experience into three natures and arguing that what appears as an external world is a construction of consciousness. Its relation to Madhyamaka has been argued about for fifteen centuries, some reading the two as compatible descriptions at different levels, others as rivals.
The Tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature literature poses the sharpest question, because it speaks of something permanent, blissful and pure within all beings, which reads as an affirmation of exactly what emptiness denies. Tibetan traditions divide on it: the position known as emptiness of other holds that the awakened nature is empty of defilements but not of itself, while the dominant Gelug position insists that Buddha-nature must be understood as emptiness itself and rejects any reading that reintroduces an inherently existing ground.
The comparison worth drawing is with Advaita Vedanta, which is often assimilated to emptiness in popular writing and is close to its opposite. Advaita affirms one absolutely real thing, Brahman, and holds the world of distinctions to be superimposed on it. Madhyamaka denies inherent existence to everything, including any absolute. Shankara accused Buddhists of nihilism; Buddhist opponents accused Advaita of smuggling back the self that the whole tradition was founded on denying. Both charges were sincere.