This article records tradition as it has been passed down and reported. Its sources are not yet part of the atlas's verified catalogue.
Traditions differ sharply in how, or whether, they institutionally process a miracle claim. The Catholic Church's canonization process requires a documented, medically unexplained healing, reviewed by its own Congregation for the Causes of Saints, before that healing counts toward declaring someone a saint, a formal, centuries-old bureaucratic procedure built specifically to test miracle claims rather than simply accept them. Islamic tradition distinguishes a prophet's mu'jizat, a miracle understood as confirming prophethood, from a saint's lesser karamat, a wonder worked through a holy person without claiming prophetic status. South Asian traditions describe siddhis, extraordinary powers said to arise from advanced spiritual practice, treated differently across Hindu and Buddhist schools, with some traditions warning against pursuing siddhis as a distraction from the deeper goal they are meant to be a byproduct of, rather than an end in themselves.
Comparative and historical method treats a miracle account first as a text, asking when it was written relative to the event it describes, who wrote it and what other evidence corroborates or contradicts it, the same discipline applied to any other historical claim examined in this atlas. This approach neither affirms nor dismisses a miracle claim on principle; it establishes what can actually be documented about the claim's own history before any further judgment is made.
The philosophical study of miracle testimony has its own separate history within this field. David Hume's eighteenth century argument holds that a miracle report should be weighed against the uniform experience underlying what is understood as natural law, and that this weighing will nearly always favor doubting the report over accepting a violation of that law. Hume's argument remains actively debated among philosophers of religion, some defending it, others challenging its assumptions about evidence and probability, which makes it a live methodological question in the field rather than a settled one.