Temperance, temperantia, is the one virtue that appears in both virtue schemes treated in this collection, standing against gluttony among the contraries and holding a place among the four cardinal virtues. The cardinal four, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, are not originally Christian: they are the virtues of Plato's Republic, taken up by Aristotle and the Stoics, named as a group at Wisdom 8:7, and absorbed into Christian moral theology by Ambrose, who appears to have coined the term cardinal, from cardo, a hinge. Temperance in this scheme is the ordering of the appetites for pleasure, chiefly of touch and taste, and it governs a family of subordinate virtues including chastity, sobriety, abstinence, meekness and modesty. It is the virtue most concerned with measure, and the classical formula that virtue lies in the mean is nowhere more directly applied.
Plato's Republic, Book IV, is the specific text behind the later Christian scheme: there Plato assigns wisdom to the rulers, courage to the guardians, and identifies sophrosyne, usually translated temperance but carrying a broader sense of soundness of mind and self-mastery, as the virtue proper to the whole city when each part willingly accepts its place, with justice naming the harmony of all three together. Ambrose's fourth-century adoption of this fourfold scheme for Christian moral theology preserved Plato's structure while relocating its object from the ideal city to the individual soul, a shift subsequent Christian ethics, including Aquinas's own systematic treatment, took for granted rather than argued afresh.